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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he aims and objectives of [intellectual property] and
antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.
However, the two bodies of law are actually complemen-
tary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry
and competition.'
Most efforts by firms to restrict reverse engineering of their
software, and corresponding agreements by customers not to reverse
engineer their supplier's software, are not likely to raise significant
antitrust issues. If a customer, without authorization, were to reverse
engineer software to produce a "knock-off' or identical copy of that
software for use or sale, this would violate the software owner's
copyright. Generally speaking, customers' agreements not to violate the
basket of rights bestowed on the copyright holder by law raise no
troubling antitrust issues.
Consider, however, the following three hypotheticals:
(1) A small, start-up software company called Phoenix believes
that its programmers have the skill to make major advances
in a new spreadsheet program compared to those currently
on the market. One of those existing products, called
Calcpro, holds a dominant share (ninety percent) of the
market for spreadsheet software. Calcpro was developed
and is marketed by a very large software company,
MicroBig. In order to facilitate development of its new,
breakthrough spreadsheet, Phoenix desires to reverse
engineer Calcpro. This reverse engineering is necessary
because MicroBig has released no technical information
regarding Calcpro, and Phoenix's engineers can learn little
from simply running a copy of the commercial version.
While the new program will be a competitive substitute for
Calcpro, it will achieve its functionality and improvements
without using in its code any of the protected expression in
Calcpro. In order to obtain a copy of Calepro, Phoenix
must enter into a license agreement that restricts its right to
copy the program and specifically prohibits reverse engi-
neeringfor any purpose.




(2) Assume the same general setting as in hypothetical one
except that Phoenix seeks to develop a complementary or
"add-on" product, rather than a competitive substitute for
Calcpro. This software program would work with the
original spreadsheet to balance a checkbook. MicroBig
does not have its own checkbook program but is planning
to enter that market. MicroBig embeds software "locks" in
Calcpro, solely designed to impede the reverse engineering
of Calcpro and any interaction with elements needed to
build a compatible checkbook program. At the same time,
MicroBig fully discloses to its own programmers who are
developing a checkbook product the information necessary
to work around these obstacles.
(3) The Alpha Company wishes to provide services that
compete in a software product's "aftermarket." Alpha
would like to reverse engineer the operating system and
diagnostic software that have been developed by Zeta for its
line of minicomputers. This reverse engineering would
enable Alpha to better undertake maintenance, repair, and
troubleshooting for Zeta computers owned by others.
While Zeta computers represent only ten percent of the total
market for minicomputers, Zeta's operating system soft-
ware is used on over ninety percent of its minicomputers.
Alpha lawfully possesses a copy of the operating system
and diagnostic software that it seeks to reverse engineer by
virtue of buying a Zeta computer and its bundled software.
However, the terms of Alpha's shrink-wrap license limit the
softvare's use to functions necessary to operate or maintain
only the computer bought by Alpha. Zeta, which holds an
eighty percent share of the service aftermarket for Zeta
computers, first threatens and later sues Alpha for copyright
infringement, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief.
Zeta alleges that Alpha has reverse engineered Zeta's
operating system and diagnostic software and is illegally
using knowledge gained therefrom to provide its services to
third parties. Zeta ultimately loses the suit, but Alpha's
revenues drop precipitously and its financial stability is
jeopardized as a result of the threats and expensive litiga-
tion.
While these are but a few of the many contexts in which controver-
sies involving the reverse engineering of software arise in today's
-software and related-products markets, each hypothetical points to an
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area where antitrust and intellectual property law intersect in an uneasy
fashion. Should the basket of rights conferred by copyright law be
allowed to restrain competitive activities such as those suggested by the
above scenarios? The courts have onlyjust begun to grapple with these
issues, resulting in an immature body of law where there are few clear
guidelines for both the software industry and antitrust enforcement
authorities. This Article presents an overview of how the laws prohibit-
ing certain acts of monopolization, attempts to monopolize, refusals to
deal, and tying arrangements might apply to restrictions and agreements
on the reverse engineering of computer software. As a necessary
foundation for this analysis, however, this Article first defines reverse
engineering of computer software. It then briefly describes the contours
of intellectual property protection for software, including the fair use and
the copyright misuse doctrines. No competent antitrust analysis could
be performed in isolation from these closely related bodies of law.
Building upon this predicate, the antitrust analysis of each of the above
scenarios is then presented.
II. REVERSE ENGINEERING OF COMPUTER
SOFTWARE DEFINED
The concept of reverse engineering as applied to computer software
normally refers to a variety of practices undertaken to understand how
a software program is built and how it achieves its functionality. Unlike
other forms of literary expression, such as books, software cannot be
simply "opened up" and read or examined. In its finished state ("object
code" form), computer software consists of machine-readable object
code that is not meaningful to or comprehensible by humans. Most
software is sold or leased to end-users in object code form. While
software users can easily observe the outward functioning of the
program, they cannot as easily perceive the ideas, processes, structures,
or actual methods of operation of the program as it was written.
In the typical software development process, programmers write
code in a programming language using alphanumeric characters that can
be understood by a person familiar with the language. This form of the
program is referred to as "source code." After the source code is written,
it is translated by a "compiler" program into the machine-readable object
code.
In order to understand the ideas and "inner workings" of a computer
program, one must therefore obtain either the original source code or
detailed written specifications from the program's developer. If these
cannot be obtained, it becomes necessary to undertake a process of
independently "decompiling" the object code back into source code.
Because of factors inherent in the present technology, it is practically
[Vol. 9
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impossible to decompile object code back into an exact replica of the
original source code.2
For the purposes of copyright law analysis, it is important to
understand that it is impossible to undertake the process of
decompilation without at some point making a copy of either some or all
of the program. Copying may take the forms of loading the program into
computer memory, outputting it to a screen or printer, or copying it to
other media.
The information provided by decompilation of software can be used
for a variety of purposes. As will be discussed below, the particular
purpose may well be dispositive in determining whether the process of
reverse engineering in any given instance runs afoul of the copyright
law. Briefly, the objectives of decompilation might be categorized as
follows:
" Copies. Information regarding the structure, functions,
ideas, and expression embodied in a program may be
sought for the purpose of creating an identical or substan-
tially similar substitute product.
" Functional Equivalents. Alternatively, the information
could be sought for the purpose of creating a functionally
equivalent, but not identical, product. The distinction
between this type and the direct copy is that the developer
of the new code aims to enable his program to perform the
same function as the code that has been studied, but
achieves that functionality by code structure and procedures
developed independently (not copied) from the original
code2
" Interoperable Products. In addition to copies or functional
equivalents, information about a program is frequently
desired in order to build interoperable software or hardware
products, or to provide service. Such interoperable prod-
ucts could enhance or add entirely new functionality to the
original software. The need for such information is particu-
2: Thus, while we frequently refer to the process of"decompilation," it should be
understood that there is fio simple process or technology by which this can be accomplished.
3. Inthis context, reverse engineeringis usedin a"cleanroom!'developmentprocess,
in which one group of programmers studies the original (target) code, writes a set of
finctional specifications, and then gives those specifications to another group who never
had access to the original code. These programmers, who were never exposed to the
original, then develop their own code to achieve the desired functionality.
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larly great when the software has obtained widespread
acceptance in the market, has become a standard, represents
a critical component in a larger system, or provides "low
level" and highly functional services in a system.4
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONTEXTS
A. Intellectual Property Rights Relevant to Protection of
Computer Software
Computer software may be protected by trade secret, patent,
copyright, or certain combinations thereof. Each body of law confers
the potential to limit use of the protected software, with attendant
consequences for the terms of competition in the marketplace. Over the
years, U.S. jurisprudence and legislation have reconciled some of the
inherent tensions between antitrust and intellectual property laws by
recognizing that efforts to enforce intellectual property rights beyond
their proper scope may give rise to antitrust liability.
Historically, courts have tended to draw few distinctions in the
treatment of antitrust issues raised in patent and copyright cases.
Recently, however, a few courts have begun to apply a more critical
analysis recognizing some significant distinctions in the substantive
protections and underlying objectives of the patent and copyright law
Nevertheless, because most software protection has been obtained and
enforced in recent years through the application of copyright law, this
Article will focus on antitrust analysis in the context of copyright law.
1. Basic Concepts of Copyright Law Applicable to Software
Our intention in this Article is to briefly note some of the basic
concepts of copyright law relevant to our antitrust analysis. This Article
therefore will not cover the substance of software copyright law in depth
because this subject is discussed in great detail in other treatises and
articles.
4. Examples include ROM BIOS or operating system software.
5. See, e.g., United Statesv. ParamountPictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (applying
rule of patent tying cases to block-booking of copyrighted motion pictures).
6. See Leslie Wharton, Misuse and Copyright: A Legal Mismatch, COMPUTER L.,
Mar. 1991, at 1.
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a. Scope of Copyright Protection Afforded Software
The applicability of copyright law to computer software was
legislatively confirmed by the Software Copyright Act of 1980! While
this Act settled the question of whether software could be protected
underthe copyright law, it did not specifically delimitthe scope or nature
of such protection. This task has been left to the courts, which have
struggled to apply a body of law developed in the context of more
traditional types of literary works.
b. Idea versus Expression
A substantive analysis of copyright law applied to software must
begin with an understanding of a basic precept of copyright law:
protection extends to an author's expression of a given idea, not to the
idea itself. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act states: "[i]n no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."' Courts asked to
apply copyright law to software have had difficulty in determining
exactly what is protectible expression versus what is an unprotectable
idea or procedure in a given program. Indeed, there is no consensus on
how to analytically approach the question.
c. The Altai Methodology
The leading case in this field of law is Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Alta, Inc.,9 in which the Second Circuit undertook
a thoughtful and detailed consideration of how to both analyze and
determine whether one piece of software infringed another.'0 The Altai
court first rejected the view, adopted in earlier cases, that there is but one
idea embodied in a piece of software." Instead, the court broke the
7. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, sec. 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028
(amending 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
9. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
10. See id.
1I. See, e.g., Whelan v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cerl.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Nimmer indicates that, "[t]he crucial flaw in [%Vhelan's]
reasoning is that it assumes that only one 'idea,' in copyright law terms, underlies any
computer program, and that once a separable idea can be identified, everything else must
be expression." 3 MeLViLLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[F], at 13-62.34 (1991).
No. 2]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
plaintiffs program into conceptually-separate modules, each potentially
representing a non-protectible idea, and isolated the remaining
protectible code for comparison with the defendant's code.
The Altai court also established the applicability of the "merger"
doctrine to computer software, holding that copyright protection is not
available in such instances where the module's idea cannot be separated
from the creative and technical expression. Thus, the court found the
plaintiffs expression here to be principally dictated by function, in that
many of the similarities between the two programs stemmed from the
functional requirement that they be fully compatible with an IBM
mainframe and operating system. Altai's expression was therefore held
not to be protected by copyright.
d. Fair Use
The Copyright Act generally allows anyone to engage in fair use of
copyright protected works.' 2 Controversy exists, however, over the
scope of fair use. Specifically, is a person who lawfully possesses a copy
of a work is entitled to use that work to understand its ideas, processes,
and methods of operation?
Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that fair use covers
reproductions for such purposes as criticism, comment, scholarship, or
research. 3 The statute specifies four criteria to be considered in
determining whether a given use is covered by the fair use exception:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 4
It is important to note that the Copyright Act makes clear that the above
four factors are not exclusive and that others may be weighed in what is
essentially an equitable defense.
The fair use exception has been applied and interpreted in several
recent software copyright cases. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of





America, Inc.' raised the question of whether certain efforts by Atari to
develop its own program to unlock the Nintendo game console and allow
an Atari game program to be run on the console violated Nintendo's
copyrights in the locking software. 6 The Federal Circuit ultimately
upheld the grant of a preliminary injunction against Atari based on the
copyright claim after clarifying the application of the fair use doctrine in
cases of reverse engineering of copyrighted software. Most importantly,
the Federal Circuit admonished the lower court for assuming that reverse
engineering was copyright infringement and held that copying associated
with reverse engineering was notper se infringement. The court stated
that, "reverse engineering object code to discern the unprotectable ideas
in a computer program is a fair use." 7 The court reached this conclu-
sion by noting that the underlying policy objectives of the Copyright Act
were not to reward authors, but to promote the progress of science and
encourage authors to share their works."8 The Federal Circuit was also
persuaded by the fact that software in object code form cannot be
understood without some intermediate copying, noting, "an individual
cannot even observe, let alone understand, the object code on Nintendo's
chip without reverse engineering."' 9 The decision in Atari required that
a reverse engineering infringement analysis in the context of reverse
engineering move beyond the question of intermediate copying to an
examination of both the purpose of the decompiling and the resulting
product itself.
The second major case in this field is Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc.,-" which reached a similar conclusion. The Ninth Circuit
held it is fair use to make intermediate copies of plaintiff's code provided
there is no other way for defendant to study and understand the code, and
there is no substantial similarity between the defendant's and the
plaintiffs final products.2 ' In finding fair use the Ninth Circuit gave
serious attention to the competition issues raised by the case, noting that,
15. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
16. See id. An original complaint was filed by Atari alleging unfair competition,
antitrust violations, and patent infringement. See id. at 835. Nintendo later sued for unfair
competition, copyright and patent infringement, and trade secret violations. See id.
Nintendo was granted a preliminary injunction on its copyright claim and appeal was taken
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See Id.
17. Id. at 843.
18. See id. at 842.
19. Id.at843-44. Butsee DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc, 898
F. Supp. 1183, 1188 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (finding that a prima facie showing of copyright
infringement exists when the defendant's software is "virtually identicar to the plaintiff's
software, unless the defendant canprove fairuse to excuse the"dissembling or intermediate
copying"), aff'd, No. 95-10850, 1996 WL 175511 (5th Cir. 1996).
20. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
21. See id. at 1527.
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"[Sega's] attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for
others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting
creative expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for
resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine."z At least one other
circuit court has since followed the Ninth Circuit's lead to expressly hold
that disassembly of copyrighted software may be fair use.
While not directly affecting the fair use language of § 107 of the
Copyright Act, a significant battle is now brewing in Congress over
proposed § 1201 of the National Information Infrastructure Copyright
Protection Act,24 which seeks to amend U.S. copyright law to prohibit the
manufacture, distribution, or importation of technologies which
circumvent anticopying systems designed to protect copyrighted works.
Thus if a software product included code to prevent decompilation,
anyone who developed or distributed a product with "the primary
purpose or effect" of evading that code would be committing an unlawful
act.
25
This proposal has been strongly criticized by numerous trade
associations, by the computer electronics industry, and by educators and
librarians as well.26 The interoperable software industry is particularly
concerned about the provision precisely because of the possibility that
the amendment will be used to prohibit activity found to be lawful fair
use under Sega and.Atari. These critics note that the proposed amend-
22. Id. at 1523-24. See also Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Technology, Inc.,
908 F. Supp. 1409 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding no fair use of competitor's hardware
parameter values by the defendant-distributor where distributor copied values simply to
avoid having to create its own values, and not to facilitate study of the functional aspects
of the hardware system).
One court, however, has held that a software developer may charge a licensing fee to
a firm that makes a copy of its software in order to service customers using that software.
Rejecting the defendant's fair use argument, the court in Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995), declined to find fair use and followLasercomb
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), because the plaintiff did not attempt
to prohibit the defendant from developing its own competitive service software. See Triad
Sys., 64 F.3d at 1336-37. For a more detailed discussion of the Lasercomb decision, see
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
23. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F.3d 1532, 1540 (1lth Cir. 1996) ("'lWhere
disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied
in a copyrighted computerprogram, and where there is alegitimate reason for seeking such
access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work as amatteroflaw."(quoting Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992)))
24. HR. 2441 and S. 1284, 104th Cong. Ist Sess. (1995). This provision grewout of
the Working Group on intellectual Property Rights' "White Paper" ofSeptember 1995. See
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA5TRUCUREm REPORTOF
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RGHTS, at 230-34 (1995).
25. H.R. 2441 and S. 1284, 104th Cong. Ist Sess. § 1201 (1995).
26. These include the American Committee for Interoperable Systems and the
Computer and Communications Industry Association.
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ment would establish a harsher standard for anticopy circumvention
devices than for the devices actually used to do the copying. In its
decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.,27 the
Supreme Court made clear that a copying device does not contribute to
copyright infringement if it has substantial non-infringing uses. By
contrast § 1201 would prohibit the use of devices that had substantial
non-infringing uses if the primary purpose or effect of the device was to
promote copyright infringement. The "effects" test is particularly
troubling because of its potential to implicate software developers who
build products genuinely intended for lawful uses but which are
subsequently adopted for unlawful acts. In response to this opposition,
lawmakers are taking a critical look at 6 1201, and it is unclear whether,
or in what form, this provision will emerge from the legislative process.
Finally, while outside the scope of U.S. legal precedent, it might also
be noted that in 1991 the European Community (now the European
Union) adopted Council Directive No. 91/250 ("Software Directive")
which allows some forms of reverse engineering.28 In particular, the
Software Directive allows intermediate copying where those acts "are
indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the
interoperability of an independently created computer program with
other programs. ' 9 Importantly, the Software Directive also stipulates
that this right to decompilation may not be negated between parties by
contract.30 Many of the innovation-related policy considerations
discussed in the Atari and Sega decisions appear to have motivated the
European Community to adopt this Directive?'
B. Copyright Cases InvolvingAntitrust Claims
It has long been recognized that antitrust problems can arise in the
case of copyright acquisition, licensing, and enforcement, just as they
27. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
28. See Council Directive No. 911250, 1991 0. (L 122) 43 [hereinafter Software
Directive].
29. Ma at art. 6(1). The Software Directive subjects the right to decompilation to the
following conditions:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having
a right to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person
authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previ-
ously been readily available to the persons referred to in subparagraph
(a); and
(c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which are
necessary to achieve interoperability.
30. See id. at art. 9(1).
31. Seeid.at43.
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may with other types of intellectual property. As the Supreme Court
noted, "the copyright laws confer no rights on copyright owners to fix
prices among themselves or otherwise to violate the antitrust laws." '32
This basic proposition was recently confirmed by the First Circuit, which
stated that, "although creation aid protection of original works of
authorship may be a national pastime, the Sherman Act does not
explicitly exempt such activity from antitrust scrutiny and the courts
should be wary of creating implied exemptions."'3 While affirming the
applicability of antitrust law to copyright, the cases make clear that the
antitrust analysis must, nonetheless, be sensitive to the underlying
policies and concerns of copyright law.34
The number of cases explicitly considering antitrust issues in the
context of copyright are relatively few and are largely concentrated in the
areas of blanket licensing of copyrighted music and motion pictures,
alleged tying of copyrighted software to hardware or services, and
mergers. Copyright issues implicitly arise in the antitrust analysis of
virtually all of those cases, however, since copyrights typically form the
basis of the disputed market power.
C. Misuse Defense Distinguishedfrom an Affirmative Antitrust
Claim/Counterclaim
Before turning to a discussion of antitrust law as applied to reverse
engineering of software, it is important to distinguish the various
procedural contexts in which antitrust issues may be raised. Patent law
has long recognized misuse as an equitable defense to infringement in
cases where the patentee has attempted to extend the reach of his patent
beyond its proper scope. 5 While the Supreme Court has yet to clearly
establish the availability of a misuse defense in copyright cases, and
32. BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. ColumbiaBroadcasting Sys, Ina, 441 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
33. Data General Corp. v. Grunan Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,1185 (lst Cir.
1994). The opinion went on to cite Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier TarlffBureau, Inc.,
476 U.S. 409,421 (1986) ("JElxemptions from the antitrust laws are strictly construed and
strongly disfavored"). Data General, 36 F.3d at 1185.
34. See id.; see also National Cable Television Advertising Ass'nv. BroadcastMusic,
Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614 (D.D.C. 1991).
35. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
[Vol. 9
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several commentators oppose such a development,36 several recent cases
suggest that the doctrine may be taking root in U.S. jurisprudence.
The leading case in this nascent line is Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds,7 in which the Fourth Circuit held that it was misuse for the
plaintiff to have included in its software license a clause prohibiting its
licensee from participating in the development of any competitive
software for a period of ninety-nine years. The court found substantial
similarities between the underlying policies of the patent and copyright
laws" and reasoned on that basis that the misuse defense should also be
available in copyright cases?9
36. The objections centerprincipally on the differences in the nature and scope of the
protection afforded by copyright as opposed to patent law. Itis argued that-whereas patent
protection is narrow but deep, allowing the patentee to preclude all use of the subject
invention, copyright protection does not preclude use of underlying ideas and procedures,
and is therefore broad and thin. The copyright grant thus conveys much less power to the
copyright holder to materially affect competition. Because there is less danger of
anticompetitive impact, some argue courts should be less willing to apply the misuse
doctrine developed under patent law to copyrights. See Wharton, supra note 6. Other
objections to the misuse defense have focused more specifically on its applicability to
software cases. See, e.g., Marshall Leaffer, EngineeringCompetitive Policy and Copyright
Misuse, 19 U. DAYTONL. REV. 1087 (1994). In the software area, critics point to the fact
thatsoftware is often protected by both copyright and trade secret law and thatrecognizing
a copyright misuse defense in such cases would inevitably lead to forced disclosure of the
trade secret-protected portion of the code.
37. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
38. See id. at 975. The court in Lasercomb followed the Supreme Court holding in
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953):
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts."
Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.
The Lasercomb court wisely noted:
The philosophy behind copyright, parallel to that discussed above for
patent, is that the public benefits from the efforts of authors to introduce
new ideas and knowledge into the public domain. To encourage such
efforts, society grants authors exclusive rights in their work for a limited
time.
Id. at 975.
39. See Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the Federal Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit law, held that,
"under the appropriate factual setting, copyright misuse may be a viable defense against a
claim of copyright infringement."2Ia at 845. The court went on to note that, "the United
States Supreme Court has given at least tacit approval of the defense." Id. at 846 (citing
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S.38 (1962)). InData General Corp. v. Grumann Sys.
Corp., 36F.3d 1147 (lstCir. 1994), the First Circuit, although citing authority in support
of the misuse defense, stopped short of adopting it because the court found the underlying
antitrust claims meritless. Id. at 1170-71. The court noted that, while theLasercomb court
held that the misuse defense did not require proofofan antitrust violation, the defendant in
No. 2]
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If successfully asserted, a misuse defense can preclude the enforce-
ment of a copyright against an infringer until the misuse is stopped and
its effects have dissipated. It must be distinguished from an affirmative
antitrust claim/counterclaim, which would, if successful, result in a
finding of antitrust liability and an award of antitrust remedies - an
injunction and treble damages. While there is much substantive overlap
in both misuse and antitrust analysis of the competitive impact of the
contested practice, the misuse defense does not require proof of all the
elements necessary to establish an antitrust violation ° The Lasercomb
court succinctly stated: "The question [in a misuse defense] is not
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law
... but whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the
public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.""'
An anticompetitive use of a copyright may thus be asserted either by
means of a misuse defense, an antitrust claim/counterclaim, or both. The
proof required will depend on the specific way in which the matter is
asserted. We focus below on analysis of antitrust law in the context of
an antitrust claim or counterclaim. In most instances, however, proof of
an antitrust violation will also establish misuse.42
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
A large number of antitrust issues could potentially arise from
situations involving the reverse engineering of computer software. This
Article, however, will address only those circumstances that the authors
believe are most likely to arise and cause significant antitrust problems,
using the three hypotheticals outlined in the Introduction as useful points
of orientation. This part will analyze how the antitrust prohibitions
against certain acts of monopolization, attempts to monopolize, refusals
to deal, and tying arrangements might be relevant to these general
situations.43 The antitrust analysis will be performed on a relatively
general level, as even small changes in the underlying facts can have
dramatic effects on the antitrust outcome.
this instance failed to assert its defense in any terms other than the Sherman Actviolation.
Id. at 1169-70.
40. Some of the more troublesome proofs required in an antitrust analysis, include
market power, competitive injury, and antitrust standing.
41. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
42. Whether and under what circumstances a copyright holder's efforts to limit
decompilation will give rise to misuse will turn largely on the equities of each case. As a
general proposition, there appears to be no reason why such actions could not give rise to
misuse. See Leaffer, supra note 36, at 1102.
43. Otherpotential antitrustissues, including conspiracy to monopolize, conspiracy to
restrain trade, and vertical restraints are omitted because they are less likely to arise.
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A. Monopolization
The offense of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act"
requires that plaintiff: (1) define a "relevant market;" (2) show that
defendant possesses "monopoly power" within this market; and (3)
demonstrate that this monopoly power was acquired or maintained by
anticompetitive "willful" acts, "as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident."45 These three requirements, which are among the
most difficult to define in antitrust, are discussed in turn.
1. Definition of the Relevant Market
The relevant market consists of any product(s) or groups of products
that effectively compete with the product in question. These are the
goods or services that, as a matter of commercial reality, might be able
to prevent or significantly constrain any supracompetitive pricing by a
hypothetical monopolist of the product(s) in question 6 The relevant
market must be defined in terms of two dimensions: the product(s)
involved (the product market) and the geographical area(s) affected (the
geographic market).47
This analysis may be especially complex in cases involving the
reverse engineering of computer software because two or more relevant
products will often be involved. Consider, for example, the situations
presented in hypotheticals two and three. In hypothetical two, involving
a spreadsheet and an interoperable checkbook program, it is likely that
separate product markets would be defined for both the spreadsheet and
the complimentary checkbook program. In hypothetical three, as many
as four separate markets may need to be defined: the computer hardware,
the operating system software, the diagnostic software, and the computer
service markets.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, orcombine orconspirewith any otherperson orpersons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony... !'
45. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The intent
requirement forthe offense ofmonopolization is notgenerally an issue, "forno monopolist
monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." United States v. Aluminum Co. ofnAm.,
148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (holding that the relevant market includes those
products to which "customers may turn... if there is a slight increase in the price of the
main product.").
47. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,324 (1962).
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a. Relevant Product Market
The Supreme Court set forth the general principles under which
product markets are to be defined in United States v. E.I DuPont de
Nemours & Co.: 5
The "market" which one must study to determine when a
producer has monopoly power will vary with the part of
commerce under consideration. The tests are constant.
That market is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced - price, use and qualities considered. 9
Products are considered to be in the same market if they are reasonably
interchangeable in iVse and if their prices are reasonably comparable.
These two concepts are often related, for even if two products theoreti-
cally could substitute for one another they would not do so as a practical
matter if the price of the potential substitute was too high. To take-
account of this, courts consider the cross-elasticity of demand for the two
products as indicated by "the responsiveness of the sales of one product
to price changes of the other."'50 The Court in DuPont reasoned that,
"[ilf a slight decrease [or increase] in the price of[a product] ... causes
a considerable number of customers of [other products to switch to that
product] ... it would be an indication that a high cross-elasticity of
demand exists between them; that the products compete in the same
market."5'
A similar approach is contained in the U.S. Department of Justice's
Merger Guidelines. 2 To define a product market, the 1992 Merger
Guidelines begin by examining each product produced or sold by both
merging firms. They then ask whether a "small but significant and
nontransitory" price increase (the Guidelines suggest five percent for one
year) by a hypothetical monopolist would cause buyers to switch to other
products and thus make the increase unprofitable. If the answer is yes,
then the market is expanded to include the additional products.53
48. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
49. Id. at 404.
50. Id. at 400.
51. Id- The DuPont test may yield an overly-broad market because pre-existing market
power will lead a firm to raise price until the product in question competes with other
products. Forthe origin ofthe "cellophane fallacy," see Donald F. Tumer, Antitrust Policy
andthe Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281,308-13 (1956).
52. U.S. DepL ofJustice andU.S. Federal Trade Comm'n, MergerGuidelines, 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at 20,569 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines].
53. See id. § 1.11.
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Both use and price comparisons are often matters of degree. It is
difficult to predict, for example, how similar two computer programs
would have to be before they would be considered to be within the same
relevant market for antitrust purposes.O They need not be identical, but
how different could they be and still be considered "reasonably inter-
changeable?" Similarly, suppose there are two programs that accomplish
virtually the same tasks but one is a "deluxe" version that does more and
sells for a higher price. How much higher must that price be before the
products are considered to be in different relevant markets? What
percentage of consumers would have to switch to the deluxe version if
the less expensive product's price rose ten percent (as a result of product
monopolization) for the two products to be considered "reasonably
interchangeable" in terms of use and price? This is an extremely
complex and intensely fact-dependent area of law."
Consequently, the definition of product markets for copyright
purposes can become particularly difficult in cases where a court has
before it issues involving fair use,5" misuse, 7 and affinative antitrust
claims. The theories of market definition under each of these bodies of
54. Product market analysis in software cases is made more difficult by underlying
technological factors such as operating system and hardware compatibility. Consider the
situation inwhich two spreadsheetproducts perform nearly identical functions, and costthe
same, butone is designed to ran only on an Intel 'IBM-compatible" microprocessor whereas
the other runs only on a Sun Workstation. Serious arguments can be made that the two
products, although identically priced and functionally similar, do not compete with each
other for purposes of antitrust analysis. From the perspective of buyers locked into a
particular item of hardware, the products would not be substitutes. From the perspective
ofa prospective purchaser trying to decide between an Intel "IBM-compatible" micropro-
cessorand a Sun Workstation, however, the two programs mightwell be substitutes for one
another. For example, in the recent case of United States v. Microsoft Corp., the Justice
Department's Complaint defined the relevantproduct market as operating systems for "x86"
microprocessors and implicitly rejected a broader inarket definition that would include
operating systems designed to run on other hardware platforms. See Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 59 Fed.
Reg. 42,845,42,846-47 (1994).
55. For additional considerations, see A.B.A.ANrIrRUST SEcrloNANTrusTLAw
DEVELOPMENrS 196-208 (3d ed. 1992).
56. Asis noted supra partIll(A)(1)(d), one ofthe statutory considerations in assessing
a fair use exception is, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (emphasis added).
57. The misuse defense usually focuses on the question of whether the copyright in
issue has been used to violate the antitrust laws or the public policy embodied in the
copyright grant. This, in turn, frequently begs the question of whether it has been used to
secure market power outside the market or markets to which the copyright grant pertains.
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law are far from consistent and many courts fail to maintain analytical
clarity among them.5"
b. Technology and Innovation Markets
Increasing attention has been given in recent years to assessing
market power and the impact of anticompetitive practices within what
are frequently referred to as "technology" and/or "innovation" markets.
In contrast to the traditional product market, which focuses on market
competition for the finished goods or services, technology and innova-
tion market concepts have particular relevance to copyrighted computer
software and software licensing practices.
A technology market can be defined as the intellectual property that
is licensed, transferred, or acquired (or otherwise in issue) and "technol-
ogies or goods that are close enough substitutes significantly to constrain
the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that
is licensed."'59 For example, assume a software developer!? obtains a
copyright for a program that simplifies and enhances the display of
graphical images used and manipulated in desktop publishing software.
/6 does not have a complete desktop publishing software package, but
merely licenses its program to other developers who incorporate it into
their software. Other companies offer competing technologies to display
graphical images, but /3's program is far superior, and customers of
desktop publishing software strongly prefer the /3 technology. In such a
context, the competitive effects of j's practices may be significant in the
technology market comprised of suppliers of alternative display
technologies, as well as in the market for desktop publishing software.
As with most antitrust analysis, the choice of market definition may have
a dispositive effect on the results reached. For example, it may be
possible to find the requisite market power and anticompetitive effects
in a technology market but not in the markets defined by the finished
products themselves, i.e., the desktop publishing software market.
In contrast to a technology market, where an invention or work has
been or imminently will be commercialized, an innovation market is an
analytical tool used to focus on market power and competitive effects in
58. For a more detailed treatment of this issue, see Daniel M. Wall & Charles S.
Crompton iIn, The Antitrust andIntellectualPropertyLawlIssues: Exploiting Computer
Software Copyrights in Multiple "Markets," 8 ANmTIRusT 19 (1994).
59. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,132, § 3.2.2 at 20,737 (1988) [hereinafter IP Guidelines]. The use of
technology markets in antitrust analysis is well-recognized in the intellectual property
guidelines contained in Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109.10, § 3.6. at 20,605 (1988).
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fields where firms compete in research and development directed to new
and improved products or processes.!
A licensing arrangement may have competitive effects on
innovation that cannot be adequately addressed through the
analysis of goods or technology markets. For example, the
arrangement may affect the development of goods that do
not yet exist. Alternatively, the arrangement may affect the
development of new or improved goods or processes in
geographic markets where there is no actual or likely
potential competition in the relevant goods.
The U.S. Government sought to prevent two proposed acquisitions
of note based, at least in part, on anticompetitive effects in innovation
markets. In United States v. General Motors Corp., the suit was filed
to block GM's sale of its Allison transmission division to its largest
competitor. The DOJ defined three separate markets in which the
transaction would lessen competition, two of which focused on transmis-
sion end products while the third dealt with "worldwide technological
innovation in the design and production of automatic transmissions."63
Similarly, the FTC recently incorporated innovation market analysis into
its review of Silicon Graphics, Inc.'s ("SGI") acquisition of two of the
world's three largest developers of entertainment graphics software. SGI
60. See IP Guidelines, supra note 59, at 20,738.
61. Id (citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., Complaint, UnitedStates v. General Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530, 6
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,093 (D. Del. filed Nov. 16, 1993); Complaint, United States
v. Flowlnt'l Corp., Civ. No. 94-71320,6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCI) 45,094 (E.D. Mich.
filed Apr. 4,1994). See also Proposed Consent Order and Complaint, United States v.
SensormaticElectronics Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,742 (demonstrating that the
FTC obtained modification of proposed acquisition to address reduced incentives for
research and development).
63. Complaint, UnitedStatesv. GeneralMotors Corp., Civ.No. 93-530, 6TradeReg.
Rep. (CCI) 45,093 (D. Del. filedNov. 16,1993). An example of an instance where an
innovation market is relevant to antitrust analysis is one in which there are only two
software developers with sufficient technical staff and expertise to continue improving a
piece ofsoftware. For example, with regard to Microsofts proposed acquisition of Intuit,
the DOJ filed suit to block the merger partly because of concern for the resulting
concentration of technical expertise. Both Microsoft and Intuit had personal finance
software products. While Microsoft had agreed to license its personal finance software
product (Money) to a competitor (Novell), it did not agree to transfer any "human"
resources. Thus, the DOJ stated: "The Microsoft Money team itself, including all product
managers, developers, programmers and sales and marketing personnel, apparently will
remain with Microsoft. In contrast, Microsoft has described the Intuit people as the most
important resource it will acquire if the transaction closes:' Complaint, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 94-1564, 28 (D.D.C. filed April 27, 1995).
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manufactures computer workstations used to run the entertainment
graphics software. In its complaint filed with a consent agreement, the
FTC specifically alleged that one of the anticompetitive effects of the
merger would be to "reduce innovation competition among producers of
entertainment graphics software and among producers of entertainment
graphics workstations."'
Despite the recent attention paid to both technology and innovation
markets, there are enormous practical difficulties in the application of
these concepts to real cases, as the IP Guidelines recognize. Moreover,
the concepts have yet to be applied rigorously and directly in any actual
federal antitrust decision, making it difficult to assess what role they are
likely to play with respect to reverse engineering of computer software.'
One difference that could arise from the use of a technology or
innovation market, as opposed to an end-use product market, concerns
the time frame within which competitive effects will be assessed. For
example, the 1992 U.S. Merger Guidelines ask whether a merger might
give a firm the power to impose at least a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price,' and whether potential competing
suppliers might be able to enter within two years to prevent this
increase.67 The Guidelines' two-year benchmark starts at the date of the
merger.68 Since a merger detrimentally affecting competition in a
technology or innovation market could focus or extend the search for
anticompetitive effects significantly into the future, the use of a
technology or innovation market would have the practical effect of
significantly extending the two-year benchmark.
c. Relevant Geographic Market
The relevant geographic market is defined as the area in which, as
a matter of commercial practicality, potential customers of the relevant
product will purchase it. As the Supreme Court observed:
64. Proposed Consent Orderand Complaint,Inre Silicon Graphics, Ina, 5 TradeReg.
Rep. (CCH) 23,838 (filed June 9, 1995).
65. Whileit is notunusual for antitrust cases to mention and take account ofthe effects
of anticompetitive acts on innovation, these cases usually do so within the context of
markets traditionally defined as goods or services markets. See, e.g., McCullough v.
Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948); see generally Symposium: A Critical
Appraisal of the "'Innovation Market"Approach, 64 A1NTrusTL.J. 1 (1995).
66. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, § 1.0.
67. See id § 3.2. For market-definition purposes, the Guidelines use a one year
timeframe. See id. § 1.32.
68. See id
[Vol. 9
Reverse Engineering and Antitrust
The criteria to be used in determining the appropriate
geographic market are essentially similar to those used to
determine the relevant product market.... The geographic
market selected must, therefore, both "correspond to the
commercial realities" of the industry and be economically
significant. Thus, although the geographic market in some
instances may encompass [the entire world or] the entire
Nation, under other circumstances it may be as small as a
single metropolitan area69
As is the case with relevant product market, the relevant geographic
market often changes along with price changes. For example, if a
product is priced at $100, potential customers in cityXmight purchase
only from vendors in that city. If the product is monopolized and its
price rises to $120, however, some potential customers in city Xmight
instead go to city Y where the price remains $100. At $120, the
geographic market includes both city Xand city Y. While in some cases
the determination of appropriate geographic market may be complex,
absent significant transportation or other distributional cost variances
the geographic market in most software cases will either be national or
international in scope.
2. Monopoly Power
The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as "the power to
control prices or exclude competition!"70 Proof of either element is a
sufficient predicate for a violation of § 2. The power to control prices is
often characterized as a short-term phenomenon: Can the firm at issue
profitably raise price? The power to exclude competition is considered
a long-term phenomenon, indicative that the monopolist continues to
enjoy its monopoly position."1
Monopoly power can seldom be proven directly, largely because
direct evidence that the firm in question is excessively pricing or actually
excluding competitors is rarely available7 The courts therefore rely
upon other factors to determine whether monopoly power is present.
Market share is the first indicator, and Judge Learned Hand's classic
formulation is still widely followed. Hand indicated that a ninety percent
69. BrownShoe Co.v.United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (citations omitted).
70. United States v. E.. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956).
71. For additional complexities and a further discussion ofthe meaning ofmonopoly
power,seeThomas G.Krattenmakeretal,MonopoyPowerandMarketfPowerin.4ntitrust
Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 241 (1987).
72. See A.B.A., ANTRsTLAWDsvELOPMEm,supra note 55, at.212.
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market share usually "is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful
whethersixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-
three percent is not."u Thus, there is no magic number for the required
market share. The average market share of firms found by courts to be
monopolists is between seventy-five and eighty-five percent,7' with
seventy percent market share often enough to demonstrate monopoly
power. However, firms with a fifty to sixty percent market share have
only been found to possess monopoly power under rare circumstances.75
Market share is only the starting point for determining monopoly
power. While a firm with only a forty percent market share will almost
certainly not be found to be a monopolist, neither will a firm with an
eighty percent market share if, for example, entry into the relevant
market by competitors can be accomplished quickly and easily. When
firms outside the market can enter freely and compete successfully with
the incumbent firms in two years or less,' a firm will not be found to
have the monopoly power to "control prices or exclude competition."'
While ease of entry is the most important factor, others include:
"technological superiority resulting in cost advantages, economies of
scale, the relative size of competitors, competitors' performance, pricing
trends and practices, homogeneity of products, potential competition,
and the stability of market shares over time."'7
Whether a court will determine that a particular firm has monopoly
power in a particular market depends upon many factors, and few
general conclusions can be drawn. However, two topics of particular
interest to antitrust suits involving the reverse engineering of computer
software should be noted.
The first issue is whether the owner of copyrighted software will be
rebuttably presumed to have monopoly power. The IP Guidelines state:
"The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret
necessarily confers market power upon its owner."79 However, in
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,"0 the Supreme Court
stated that when a product is patented, "it is fair to presume that the
inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller market power."'"
Justice O'Connor disagreed, and noted in a concurring opinion that "a
73. United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d 416,424 (2d Cir. 1945).
74. See Robert H. LandeAre Antitrust "Treble"Damages Really Single Damages?,
54 OHiO ST. LJ. 115, 148-51 (1993).
75. See id.
76. Cf 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 52, § 3.
77. A.B.A.,ANnTRuST LAW DEVELOPMEmrs, supra note 55, at 215-18.
78. Id. at 215.
79. IP Guidelines, supra note 59, § 2.2.
80. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
81. Id. at 16.
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patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close
substitutes for the patented product."' Because of changes in the
composition of the Court, it is unclear whether the Court today would
make a rebuttable presumption that the owner of copyrighted software
has monopoly power, especially given evidence of the existence of
similar products.' Even if such a presumption were made, moreover,
the defendant has the opportunity to rebut it.
The analysis of market power derived from copyright protection, as
opposed to other types of intellectual property rights, becomes more
complex in the case of software. In general, one would expect the
argument in favor of a presumption to be weaker in the case of copy-
rights because of the less extensive exclusionary rights afforded in
comparison with patent protection. In theory, as long as the underlying
ideas and functions cannot be protected under copyright law, it would
seem that competitive entry barriers should be lower than in the case of
patents. However, in the case of software, the reality is often more
complex. The complexity derives from the very significant distinctions
between software and other traditional types of creative expression
protected by copyright Unlike most other types of expression, software
in object-code form normally does not provide transparency of the
underlying ideas and functions embodied in the work. To the extent that
unprotectable subject matter remains undisclosed and is accessible only
by decompilation, if decompilation (i.e., reverse engineering) can be
precluded by means of copyright enforcement, the exclusionary effects
of the copyright - and hence its market power - grow considerably.
By enforcing a copyright to prevent decompilation and understanding of
unprotected subject matter, the copyright holder gains exclusionary
powers that more nearly approach those of a patent holder.
A second complexity that might be of special concern in reverse
engineering antitrust actions concerns the proper time at which the court
defines the relevant market and assesses whether monopoly power
exists. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.s' required
the Court to define a market involving copying machines and other
products.'- After customers purchased a Kodak machine, they were
effectively locked into using that machine for a considerable period of
82. Ad. at37 n.7 (O'Connnor, J. concurring).
83. InDataGeneralCorp. v. GrummanSystemsSupportCorp.,36F.3d 1147 (lstCir.
1994), which included antitrust claims involving copyrighted software, the First Circuit
found that the defendant possessed monopoly power, but cited traditional factors such as
market share (over 90%), barriers to entry, market imperfections, and supracom! etitive
prices rather than the defendant's possession of copyright. See id. at 1182 n.60.
84. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
85. See RobertIL.Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could
Play Crucial Role in Post-Kodak World, 62 ANrrrRusTLi. 193 (1993).
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time because of the high cost of switching to another manufacturer. A
key question was whether Kodak had monopoly power over these
locked-in customers even though the overall copier market was competi-
tive.
The Kodak Court held that, in view of imperfect information
considerations, it was appropriate to view the situation after consumers
were locked into Kodak's products, and that in the spare parts and
service aftermarkets Kodak had the potential for exploitative monopoly
power.8 6
The holding in Kodak has major implications for future antitrust
actions involving bans on the reverse engineering of computer software.
When consumers' information in a market for software is highly
imperfect, and when consumers become effectively locked into a
particular program or hardware platform, three things follow: (1) the
relevant market should be assessed from these locked-in customers'
perspective; (2) the software vendor's potential monopoly power should
be measured at that point;87 and (3) an aftertie (such as a tie between an
operating system and hardware service, or between a computer and its
diagnostic software) could give rise to an antitrust violation. In cases
like that posed in hypothetical three, the Kodak holding will make it
easier to establish market power, an important prerequisite to a finding
of an antitrust violation.8
86. Before 1985, potential purchasers of Kodak machines allegedly understood that
after purchasing their machines they could go to an independent service organization
("ISO") forparts and service. In 1985 or 1986, Kodak changed its policy and any customer
wishing to purchase Kodak's patented spare parts had to purchase a Kodakservice contract
as well. Kodak thus instituted an "aftertie" between parts and service, effectively
eliminating the ISOs. Due to the "lock-in" factor (the cost that would be incurred if a
customer with a Kodak machine decided to switch to a new machine), customers could be
exploitedby the aftertie. Imperfect informationpermitted the lock-in, and the Courtdefined
the market from the consumers' perspective after the lock-in was in place. The Courtsaid
that this was an unexpected change that customers of the machines could not reasonably
have anticipated. Competition involving machines, before the machine's initial purchase,
could not have protected these consumers effectively since Kodak's switch was expected
by neither Kodak's customers nor its competitors. See id. at 194-95.
A similar result was reached in Data General, where the court found the relevant
antitrustmarketto consistofthe"aftermarketforserviceofData General computers?' Data
General,36 F.3d at 1181 n.59. Inthisnarrowly-definedmarket, DataGeneralhad amarket
share that exceeded 90%. See id. at 1182 n.60.
87. Ifthe lock-in is complete and the switching costs are large, the software producer
might have a 100% market share and be found to possess monopoly power.




The Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp.9 held that a
monopoly is illegal only if the antitrust defendant engaged in "willful"
acts directed at establishing or maintaining the monopoly "as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."1 This hazy formulation
has been clarified somewhat by subsequent case law which makes it
clear that the required conduct must be more than "willful." Terms such
as "predatory," "anticompetitive," or "unreasonably exclusionary," are
generally used by courts to describe the type of conduct required for a
violation of § 2.' Even these stronger terms, however, do not clarify
how "bad" conduct must be to qualify. As the Court recently noted:
The question whether [the antitrust defendant's] conduct
may properly be characterized as exclusionary cannot be
answered by simply considering its effect on [the plaintiff].
In addition, it is relevant to consider its impact on consum-
ers and whether it has impaired competition in an unneces-
sarily restrictive way. If a firm has been "attempting to
exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency," it is fair
to characterize its behavior as predatory.
92
Numerous articles and books have been written on the questions of
which conduct should be deemed to violate the prohibition against illegal
monopolization, and of how to draw the line between pro-competitive or
benign and anticompetitive 9 behavior.' No dispositive generalizations
as to when a court will decide that conduct is bad enough to be declared
"predatory," "unreasonably exclusionary," or "anticompetitive," are
possible, other than to note that the offense ofmonopolization rarely has
been proven? 5
89. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
90. Id. at570-71.
91. See A.B.A.,ANnTRusTLAW DamLOPMENrs, supra note 55, at 221.
92. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,605 (1985)
(citations omitted).
93. Anticompetitive behavior can be classified into two general types - that which
reduces rivals' revenue (through such practices as boycotts), and that which raises their
costs. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986); see also
Krattenmaker et al., supra note 71, at 249.
94. Forrepresentative citations, seeKrattenmnakeretal.,supranote71; see alsoJames
D. Hurwitz& William E. Kovacic,JudicialAnalysis ofPredation: The Emerging Trends,
35 VAMD. L. Rha. 63, 66-70 (1982).
95. See Lande, supra note 74, at 147.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
One influential formulation deserving mention was first proposed by
then-Professor Robert Bork95 and has since been endorsed by many
courts and commentators.' Bork proposed that conduct be deemed
predatory if the conduct only made economic sense if it were to result in
a monopoly and monopoly profits. If the conduct would be profitable
even if it did not lead to a monopoly, it should be presumed benign or
procompetitive. The test therefore targets conduct that would be
economically irrational but for its adverse effect on competition."
This Article does not discuss all of the types of conduct that have
been evaluated by courts under § 2 of the Sherman Act." It instead
focuses upon a few areas - the essential facilities doctrine (illegal
refusals to deal), sham litigation and business torts, and monopoly
leveraging -that will probably be most relevant to monopolization suits
involving the reverse engineering of computer software.
a. The Essential Facilities Doctrine (Illegal Refusals to Deal)
The essential facilities doctrine originated in two early antitrust
cases. United States v. Terminal RailroadAss'n. 11 concerned the sole
railroad bridge crossing the Mississippi river along a several-hundred
mile segment. The Supreme Court held that it was illegal for the group
of railroads that jointly owned this "essential facility" not to allow a
competing railroad to use it. However, the Court explained in United
States v. Colgate & Co., 1 that "[iln the absence of any purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long-
recognized right of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely
private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
96. See ROBERTBORK, THE ANTrrMUSTPARADOX 144 (1978).
97. See Hurwitz & Kovacie, supra note 94, at 66-70.
98. See Bork, supra note 96, at 144. Hurwitz and Kovacic describe Bork's
methodology:
Professor Borkhas defined predation as a "firm's deliberate aggression
against one or more rivals through the employment of business practices
that would not be considered profit maximizing" except for two expecta-
tions: Either the conduct will drive competitors from the market, which
would give the predator a sufficient market share to command monopoly
profits, or the competitors will, through fear or a renewed spirit of
cooperation, "abandon competitive behavior the predator finds inconve-
nient or threatening."
Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 94, at 68 (footnotes omitted).
99. A single type of conduct- alleged predatory pricing- has been the focus of
numerous law review articles. For citations, see generally Hurwitz& Kovacic, supra note
94; Krattenmakeretal, supranote 71; Daniel . GiffordPredatoryPricingAnaysis in the
Supreme Court, 39 ANTntusT BULL. 431 (1994).
100. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
101. 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (interpreting the statutory construction ofthe Sherman Act).
[Vol. 9
Reverse Engineering and Antitrust
parties with whom he will deal.""02 Although the essential facilities
doctrine has been applied many times, the leading modem applications
have involved telecommunications cases. MCI Communications Corp.
v. AT&T7°3 involved charges by MCI that AT&T effectively refused to
allow MCI's long distance service to interconnect with AT&T's local
service lines. MCI argued that it was essential to have access to AT&T's
local customer lines and that the only reason AT&T refused to allow this
interconnection at a reasonable price was to protect its monopoly on
long-distance service. The court held:
A monopolist's refusal to deal under these circumstances is
governed by the so-called essential facilities doctrine. Such
a refusal may be unlawful because a monopolist's control
of an essential facility (sometimes called a "bottleneck")
can extend monopoly power from one stage of production
to another, and from one market into another. Thus, the
antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an essen-
tial facility the obligation to make the facility available on
non-discriminatory terms."°
The court held that four elements were required under the doctrine:
"(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3)
the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility
of providing the facility." ' 5 Although the contours of this doctrine are
unsettled, it seems clear that a monopolist's duty to cooperate with a
rival is stronger when the monopolist has had a long history of cooperat-
ing with this rival and did not have a valid business justification for its
decision to terminate cooperation1c6
The business justification defense is therefore the principal defense
against the invocation of the essential facilities doctrine. The other main
defense is that the defendant does not compete in the same market as the
plaintiff. Both of these defenses are consistent with Bork's definition of
predation. A monopolist's decision to deny access to an essential facility
will make economic sense if it results in a monopoly and monopoly
profits, but it will also make economic sense if: (1) the monopolist has
102. Id. at 307.
103. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
104. Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 1132-33.
106. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-05,
608 (1985). Aspen may not apply when markets are rapidly evolving. In these circum-
stances, the past patterns of dealing between competitors may not necessarily support an
inference that a present refusal to deal lacks business justification.
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a legitimate business justification for the refusal; or (2) the monopolist
does not compete in the same market as the excluded firm. Each of these
two defenses is considered below.
(i) Legitimate Business Justifications
There are perhaps an infinite number of legitimate business reasons
why a monopolist would not want to cooperate with its rivals.0 7 Three
cases illustrate this point.
In re E.1 DuPont de Nemours & Co."' involved a defendant that
refused to license its low cost technology to rivals. Reasoning that a duty
to license might chill incentives to innovate, and finding it justifiable for
a firm to choose to fully exploit its own low cost technology, the FTC
and the Ninth Circuit refused to find a § 2 Sherman Act violation."
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co."' raised the question of
whether a monopolist had a duty to predisclose to its rival its intention
to introduce a new product into the marketplace, or to provide its rivals
with technical information about new products so they could make-
compatible products.' The Second Circuit held that Kodak had no such
duty to predisclose, reasoning that after a firm undertakes the risks and
expenses of innovation it is entitled to all of the success in the market-
place that this innovation brings, and that a duty to predisclose might
chill incentives to innovate.
' 2
Finally, a series of cases involving IBM explored the issue of
whether a monopolist could integrate or modify a computer system's
components in a way that rendered competitors' interactive peripheral
devices inoperable. Several courts held that, as long as there was some
plausible respect in which the design at issue was superior or less
expensive, a monopolist was free to change its computer so as to
disadvantage producers of peripheral devices." 3 An anticompetitive
intent on the monopolist's part was deemed irrelevant," 4 as was the
107. In the patent context, the law is clear that a patentee has the right to suppress its
invention and prevent all others from using it. See United States v. StudiengeselIlschaft
Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122,1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 212 U.S. 405 (1908)). This issue is addressed in greater detail infra partIVCA) C3)Ca)(iii).
108. 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980).
109. See id. at 748.
110. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
111. See id. at281.
112. See id. at 282.
113. See, e.g., Transamerica ComputerCo., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377,1382-83
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
114. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 481 F. Supp. 965,
1005 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
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overall reasonableness of the monopolist's conduct 15 The opinions
make it clear that ambiguous situations were to be decided in favor of the
antitrust defendant because of the desire to encourage innovation. An
antitrust violation would be found only if the monopolist introduced a
deliberate incompatibility which in no respect enhanced the product's
performance or reduced its cost."6
(ii) Monopolist Does Not Compete in Affected Market
If an essential facility does not directly compete with the excluded
firm, the monopolist may arbitrarily exclude that firm from the essential
facility. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC'17 involved a suit by a
commuter airline against the publisher of the only comprehensive listing
of airline flights, before the advent of computerized airline reservations
services. Even though itwas relatively easyto include commuter airlines
in the directory, and the Guide's refusal to list them was arbitrary," the
Second Circuit held that a monopolist has no duty to deal with firms in
related markets even though this refusal placed those firms at a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage." 9 The court quoted United States v.
Colgate & Co.' for the proposition that a firm may refuse to deal with
anyone "[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monop-
oly."'2' The court also refused to extend the holding of Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States" that "a monopolist may not abuse its monopoly
power in one market to gain an improper advantage or to destroy
threatened competition in an adjacent market in which it also
operates,""I to adjacent markets in which the monopolist does not yet
115. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727,744 (9th Cir.
1979).
116. See Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1383. The various situations described
involved product changes for which there was at least some claim of finctional enhance-
ment and therefore may be contrasted with the deliberate lockout device developed by
Nintendo. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo ofAm., supra note 15 and accompanying
text. Where all of the other elements ofa strong essential facilities case are present, courts
are much more likely to demand abusinessjustification for a device designed to prevent all
reverse engineering than they are for a new product that is difficult to reverse engineer, or
for which it is difficult to develop compatible products.
117. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
118. See id. at 924.
119. See icL at 927.
120. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
121. Id. at 307.
122. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
123. OfficialAirline Guides, 630 F.2d at 925.
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operate. Other courts also agree that a monopolist therefore cannot be
found to be monopolizing a market in which it does not compete. 12
(iii) Reverse Engineering Situations
It is difficult to predict how the essential facilities doctrine would be
applied to cases involving the reverse engineering of computer software.
While few in number, certain types of software programs - particularly
those that have become official or de facto standards and those providing
basic services (such as operating systems) or interfaces - have the
potential to satisfy the MCI Communications'26 test: (1) they may
certainly involve an essential facility controlled by a monopolist of a
relevant market; (2) the competitor may be unable to practically or
reasonably duplicate the essential facility; (3) the facility may be denied
to a competitor; and (4) it may be feasible to provide the facility to the
competitor. 7 Some have argued that certain software markets are
particularly susceptible to the development of monopolistic essential
facilities, given the powerful momentum created by network externalities
combined with the exclusionary powers of intellectual property rights
usually present."
A more difficult question is whether there are legitimate business
justifications for the monopolist's refusal to allow reverse engineering
124. See id. at 927.
125. See, e.g., Beard v. Parkview Hospital, 912 F.2d 138, 144 (6th Cir. 1990); E.I.
DuPont deNemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 1984); Carleton v. Vermont
Dairy Herd Imp. Ass'n, 782 F. Supp. 926, 935 (D. Vt. 1991).
126. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
127. There are many reasons why the owner ofan "essential facility" software program
might not wish to deal with others. While it is true that the creator of an operating system
has an incentive to promote the widespread adoption of its product by encouraging others
to write useful applications to run on it, once that operating system is generally adopted
industry-wide the creator will have a strong incentive to develop applications or other
complementary products itself. Accordingly, the original creator may take steps to
disadvantage other application developers, or it may wish to prevent the development of
functional equivalents of the operating system.
128. See Comments of the American Committee for Interoperable Systems on Draft
Antitrust Guidelinesfor theLicensingand cquisiton ofIntellectualProper (submission
to the Department of Justice) (1994).
The essential facilities doctrine should apply to intellectual propertyjust as
it applies to railroad terminals, ski lift tickets, and basketball stadiums. In
fact, the potential harm to consumer welfare is even greater in the case of
a denial of access to intellectual property essential facilities because ittends
to be systemic, not localized - it is the difference between harm to
consumers nationally and to patrons of the Chicago Stadium or of a
particular ski resort.
Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
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of its software. Of course, many of the business justifications addressed
by existing case law apply equally to software products and we will not
dwell on them here. Others, however, are somewhat unique to the
software field. One such justification commonly proffered by software
manufacturers is that the copyright itself justifies the otherwise
anticompetitive behavior. This raises two questions. First, does the
scope of copyright protection proscribe the specific acts of reverse
engineering in question? Second, even if copyright protection does not
technically prohibit the acts, are there policy justifications which derive
from copyright protection to allow the otherwise anticompetitive
behavior?
As to the first question, our review of the current state of copyright
law indicates that reverse engineering is not a per se copyright infringe-
ment. When the act of reverse engineering constitutes infringement not
otherwise protected, the copyright owner is free to ban it. However,
when the use is protected under the fair use doctrine, such as in the Atari
and Sega cases, the analysis is more complex. As an initial matter, the
analysis must address the question of whether an antitrust violation can
ever be found in the refusal of a monopolist to allow a particular use
such as reverse engineering when the underlying intellectual property
law seems to give the copyright holder almost complete discretion over
licensing matters.'29 If the copyright holder can altogether refuse to
license the program, how may a lesser restraint on its use form the basis
of liability?
Unfortunately, the essential facilities doctrine has seldom been
applied in cases involving copyrighted subject matter. In one of the few
cases to confront the question directly, the First Circuit concluded:
129. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455U.S. 1016 (1982); see also United States v. StudiengesellschaftKohle, supra note 107,
at 1127. In 1988, Congress codified this absolute discretion into the patentlawby enacting
§ 271(d)(4), providing that a patentee could not be denied relief for infringement because
it"refused to license or use any rights to the patent" 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1994). The
SCMcase, which involved SCM's challenge to Xerox's refusal to license basic patents it
had acquired covering theprocess forplainpaperxerography, raises an interesting question
of whether the scope of discretion should be sensitive to the developmental stage of the
technology in question. The SCMcourt which upheld Xerox's right to deny licenses,
accorded significant weight to the fact that Xerox had acquired the intellectual property
rights and adopted apolicy ofnot giving licenses while the technology was still in its infant
stages. See SCM, 645 F.2d at 1206-09. It reasoned that the threat of antitrust liability for
refusing to license while technology was still nascent would unduly undermine the
objectives of the patent system. In contrast, the court did seem to recognize that antitrust
violations might arise where the technology "already has been commercialized success-
fully." Id. at 1205.
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[lt may be inappropriate to adopt an empirical assump-
tion that simply ignores harm to the competitive process
caused by a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a
copyright....
... [W]e hold that while exclusionary conduct can
include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a
copyright, an author's desire to exclude others from use of
its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.'
In a footnote, the court continued:
Wary ofundermining the Sherman Act, however, we do not
hold that an antitrust plaintiff can never rebut this presump-
tion, for there may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust
liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copy-
right Act.1
31
Neither was this basic licensing discretion dispositive in the other
cases that directly applied the essential facilities doctrine.32 While
greatly increasing the antitrust plaintiff's burden, these decisions suggest
that the presence of the intellectual property licensing discretion does not
represent an insurmountable barrier to full antitrust scrutiny.
Policy arguments beyond the technical confines ofthe copyright law
offered to support denial of access would likely focus on some of the
peculiarities of software markets, such as the importance of protecting
large up-front investments in development, the short product lifecycles,
and the ease of copying software. Yet, these are also factors that have
been well-recognized in both the specific terms of the Copyright Act and
its amendments, and in the case law interpreting the statutory terms such
130. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1185, 1187
(let Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 1187 n.64.
132. In the lower court, an essential facilities counterclaim in Data General was
dismissed on summary judgment based on the finding that the defendant's diagnostic
software for analyzing its computers was not an essential facility since independentservice
providers could develop their own diagnostic programs, and the defendant made its software
available to purchasers ofits computers. See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support
Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass. 1991). The court found that while Data General's
knowledge of its computer systems gave it significant advantages in the development of
diagnostic software, this was insufficientto invoke the essential facilities doctrine. See id
at 192. See also Corsearch, Inc. v. Thomson & Thomson, Inc., 792 F. Supp 305, 332
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)(holdingthatthecopyrighteddatabasewasnotan essential facility because
the plaintiff could develop a competitive database in less than one year).
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as fair use. Even though these broader policy considerations do not
preclude a finding of fair use, or even misuse, some have argued that
they should be given greater weight when considering antitrust liability
because of the severity of antitrust liability (treble damages) as compared
to fair use or misuse liability (loss of enforceability).' Although similar
arguments have been made with respect to the interaction of patent and
antitrust law, no such accommodation has been made, in part based on
the recognition that establishing all of the required elements of an
independent antitrust violation is sufficiently rigorous to deter the use of
the antitrust laws in a fashion that discourages innovation.
Beyond the special considerations attendant to protection of
intellectual property rights, more generic versions of these policy
arguments have implicitly been made and answered in favor of the
antitrust plaintiff in analogous circumstances. If the only goal was
simply to permit the defendant to protect and maximize the return on its
investment, cases like Terminal Railroad and MCI Communications
would have been decided the other way and the essential facilities
doctrine would not exist. In every successful essential facilities case, the
defendant's property rights are somewhat abridged.
The line of cases holding that the monopolist must compete in the
same market as the excluded firm has obvious applications to potential
antitrust cases involving bans on the reverse engineering of computer
software. If the company instituting the ban (e.g., the producer of an
operating system) does not compete in the same market as the firm that
wants to engage in reverse engineering (e.g., the market for word
processing), even a monopolist otherwise considered to possess an
"essential facility" can refuse to cooperate with anyone it chooses. This
is true even if the monopolist is profitably cooperating with other firms
in that market.134
To further elaborate on the application of the essential facilities
doctrine we return to hypothetical one, in which a clearly dominant
company refused a potential new entrant access to its software except on
terms that precluded reverse engineering of that product for any purpose.
If the information regarding the licensed product (Calepro) gained by
reverse engineering were essential to compete in the spreadsheet
market,'35 and the licensor's (MicroBig) broad prohibition precluded the
133. See Leslie Wharton, Misuse and Copyright: A Legal Mismatch, 8 COMPUTER L.
1,5 (1991).
134. See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920,927 (2d Cir. 1980).
135. It will generally be more difficult to establish the essential nature of the facility
(software) in the case of a competitive substitute than in the case of an interoperable or
complementary product. As in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36
F.3d 1147 (Ist Cir. 1994), most courts approach these claims with a high degree of
skepticism.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
potential new entrant (Phoenix) from undertaking otherwise legal
copying, MicroBig's behavior may be deemed unreasonably restrictive.
This then raises the possibility of antitrust liability under an essential
facilities theory.
Such behavior is roughly analogous to an attempt by the author of
a leading history textbook on the civil war to ban aspiring historians
wishing to write their own book on the subject from reading his
renowned text and using factual material contained therein to assist them
in their endeavor. The young historians know that it is essential, for both
professional and commercial success, to be familiar with other works in
the field, and to be able to show distinguishable advances over the
leading text. This cannot be done without a detailed understanding of
the standard. Upholding MicroBig's broad ban on reverse engineering
would have the similar effect of denying Phoenix the ability to fully
understand MicroBig's dominant software and make use of that
knowledge in its efforts to build a better spreadsheet 6 As such it could
constitute a serious impediment to innovation and competition.
Allowing such firms to ban the reverse engineering of their software
would give overly broad protection to the first innovator in a field,
enabling it to freeze out competing innovators in the both the product's
market and aftermarkets. This violates the copyright law's overriding
goals of ensuring the public dissemination of information and encourag-
ing innovation, and would be contrary to the antitrust laws' goal of
preventing restraints on competition and innovation.
Hypothetical two presented a situation in which a copyright holder
precluded access to its software not by license terms, but by erection of
a technological roadblock-the embedding of software code to frustrate
efforts to reverse engineer those elements of the code essential to
designing an interoperable product.'37 The lawfulness of such a scheme
136. Some have argued that allowingreverse engineering ofsotware by decompilaion
is equivalent to forcing the author of a book not only to allow his text to be read, but also
his notes, drafts, ideas, and othermaterials he prepared in the course ofcreating the finished
product. See, e.g., Testimony of R. DuffThompson, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel ofthe WordPerfect Corporation, before the Collaborators Council ofthe Agency
for Cultural Affairs, at 8-9 (Dec. 13, 1993). While the debate on this point can be quite
technical and somewhat metaphysical, it seems this position overstates the case. Reverse
engineering seeks only to comprehend what is part of and constitutes the finished program
in issue; it does not invade any of the developer's work product generated during the
developmental process except what is actually reflected in the marketed program. Drafts
and other material that helped produce the product remain secret. In this sense, it is more
analogous to the simple copying ofpages from a published book than the type of intrusion
suggested by Mr. Thompson.
137. It has been argued that as a result of the "weakened" protection against reverse
engineering flowing from Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir.
1992), and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
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may well turn on whether there was any plausible justification based on
enhanced functionality, reduced cost, or other pro-competitive objectives
for the added code. If it was a device designed purely to disadvantage
competitors and lacked any pro-competitive redeeming merit, it may well
result in antitrust liability." 8 However, it should again be noted that the
law in this area gives wide latitude to defendants and turns on highly-
technical expert and other evidence. For these reasons, it is unlikely that
many close cases will be won by antitrust plaintiffs.
Hypothetical two also premised that the holder of the essential
facility, MicroBig, was dominant in the spreadsheet market and was only
planning to enter the checkbook market. MicroBig was therefore not an
actual competitor in the market in which the reverse engineer (Phoenix)
sought to develop its product. Due to the absence of actual competition
in the market affected by MicroBig's denial of access, Official Airline
Guides, Inc.' 9 ("GAG") and its progeny may pose an obstacle to the
successful use of an essential facilities theory. This hypothetical may be
distinguished from the OAG line of cases, however, by the fact that
MicroBig had begun efforts to enter the complementary product market,
and thus while there was no actual competition such competition was
"imminent.:' 4 If an imminent or potential monopolization theory were
used, there would have to be clear evidence that the defendant was likely
to achieve market power in the affected market through the denial of
access.
that softvare developers will be more inclined to seek protection through technological
means.
138. Similar cases supportinga finding ofantitrustliability includeDigital Equip. Corp.
v. System Industries, Inc., 1990-1 CCII Trade Cases 68,901 (D. Mass. 1990), and
California Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra part
IV(A)(3)(a)(i) for a discussion of the IBM peripherals cases.
139. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
140. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest that the theory may be applied in the
case of both actual and "potential" monopolization. See PHiLLp AREEDA & HBERT
HovENKhiP, ANrmuSTLAW 620-21 (Supp. 1994). Moreover, the Antitrust Division's
recent investigation of Microsoft's Microsoft Network CMSN") strongly suggests it
considers the theory viable in the closely-related area of attempted monopolization. Atthe
time of the DOJ's investigation, Microsoft was planning to enter the market for on-line
services by bundling MSN with its new operating system, Win95, in a market that
Microsoft dominates. The DOJ stated:
Nor is it necessarily 'fatal' to an attempted monopolization claim that
Microsoft currently lacks any subscribers to its online service; a new
entrant, depending on the facts, plainly could pose a dangerous probability
ofmonoijolizing a market.
See Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Microsoft Corporation's Petition
to Set Aside Civil Investigative Demand No. 13187, Microsoft Corp. v. Anne Bingaman,
Misc. Action No. M8-85 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 1995) (citations omitted).
No. 2]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
In the third hypothetical, the manufacturer of a computer and related
operating system and diagnostic software (Zeta) refused to allow a
licensee (Alpha) to reverse engineer the software for purposes of
enabling Alpha to develop its own competitive products and aftermarket
service. In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,
141
Grumman was sued by Data General for infringement of its copyrighted
diagnostic software. Grumman asserted antitrust counterclaims, one of
which was based on an essential facilities theory. The court concluded
that the antitrust laws generally impose no obligation on innovators to
disclose or predisclose information about their systems to facilitate
competition, and denied Grumman's claim on summary judgment
1 42
There are, however, several significant distinctions between the facts
in Data General and those of the third hypothetical. First, Data Gen-
eral's claim of infringement was based on the use of its diagnostic
program in the course of service work done by Grumman for third party
owners of Data General computers. Second, the essential facility alleged
by Grumman was Data General's expertise in understanding its own
computers, and the advantages this expertise conferred upon Data
General in the design of its own diagnostic software. Grumman argued
that it should either be allowed use of the Data General software in its
service work or be given detailed schematics of Data General's comput-
ers. By contrast, the claimed infringing use in this hypothetical was for
the purposes of reverse engineering so that Alpha could develop
aftermarket software and service on its own; Alpha did not seek any
proprietary information (i.e., schematics) from Zeta. In similar fashion,
the Data General court recognized that allowing reverse engineering was
quite distinct from forcing disclosure, noting that "the impetus for
competitors to reverse engineer and produce competing solutions would
be reduced" by the forced ditclosure of proprietary information under
antitrust law.
43
Alternately, should the outcomes discussed above be dependent on
whether the antitrust plaintiff signed a license agreement? In other
words, would the existence of a contractual foundation for the restraint
have a bearing on its lawfulness? As a matter of general antitrust law,
a plaintiff's contractual agreement acquiescing to an otherwise unlawful
141. 761 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D. Mass. 1991).
142. On appeal it appears that Grumman chose not to focus on its essential facilities
theory and instead relied on an exclusionary withdrawal of assistance theory based on
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). As a result, the
FirstCircuitopinion does notdeal with Grumman's essential facilities arguments. See Data
General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
143. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 192.
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act by the defendant does not provide the defendant with a safe haven.14
There is, however, substantial debate regarding the significance of a
contractual basis for such a prohibition under intellectual property law.
This debate centers on the question of whether intellectual property law
does in fact, or should, preempt contract law in instances where parties
have agreed to a prohibition of reverse engineering. In Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd.,4  the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana statute
allowing a shrink-wrap license prohibition against reverse engineering
was preempted by federal copyright law. While the Fifth Circuit did not
focus explicitly on § 301 of the Copyright Act" it nonetheless correctly
concluded that the Louisiana statute directly intruded on several key
elements of federal copyright law. 47
Beyond the language and legislative history of § 301, others have
used recent Supreme Court decisions in Bonito Boats,' Sony,149 and
Feist, '5 to argue that neither copyright nor contract law may be used to
abridge a"rightf'to reverse engineer.' Proponents ofthis position argue
that there is a constitutional right to reverse engineer based on the First
144. Courtshavebeenparticularlyuniforminrejectinganinparidelicto defensewhere
there has beensome element ofcoercion orunilateral imposition ofterms by the defendant.
See, e.g., Goldlawr v. Shubert, 268 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
145. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). See generally Christopher Celentino et al., Vault
Corp. v. Quad Software Ltd.: InvalidatingShrink-Wrap Licenses?, 2HAV.J.L.&TcH.
151 (1987).
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (codifying Congress' intent to make federal law the
exclusive source of protection for rights that are "in the nature of copyright").
147. It has been argued, moreover, that the Vault outcome should not be particularly
sensitive to the extent to which the licensee is "informed" about the bargain he has struck.
SeeDavidA. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract andPublicPolicy: Federal Preemption
ofSoftware License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering, 53 U. Pl'rr. L. REv. 543,
615-616 (1992) ("Even making scienter a condition for liability may not sufficiently
differentiate what is otherwise a state claim for appropriation of copyrightable subject
matter.").
148. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (finding that
state law prohibiting the use or known sale of an unpatented boat design conflicts with
federalpolicy to promote freecompetition in ideas noteserving patentprotection, and thus
is preempted by federal patent law).
149. Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that
manufacturers of home video recorders not liable for contributory infringement of
copyrights because the videotape recorder is capable of uses that do not infringe upon
established copyrights).
I50. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (stating that
phonebookpublisher not entitled to copyright protection because factual information was
not copyrightable, and because the information was not organized in any original fashion
warranting copyright).
151. See, e.g., comments of Pamela Samuelson, contained in Lexis Counsel Connect;
Discuss Section; National and International Topical Forums; Intellectual Property;
CopyrightLaw;, Shdnkwraps & Copyright; Shrinkwraps Copyright (comments of Dec. 15,
1994 and Jan. 2, 1995).
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Amendment and Copyright Clause, manifest in the fair use exception to
copyright protection. The Feist Court noted:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the [copyright
holder's] labor may be used by others without compensa-
tion. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however,
this is not "some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory
scheme." It is, rather, "the essence of copyright," and a
constitutional requirement. The primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 2
b. Sham Litigation and Business Torts
Firms generally are permitted under the antitrust laws to use the
government and courts to help them achieve anticompetitive ends," but
in extreme cases sham litigation may violate the antitrust laws. Profes-
sionalReal Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, nc.''
("PRE') involved a copyright infringement lawsuit with an antitrust
counterclaim that the copyright action was frivolous and therefore a
violation of the Sherman Act. The copyright suit was dismissed, but the
Supreme Court held that an allegedly frivolous lawsuit rose to the level
of an antitrust violation only if: (1) the claim was so "objectively
baseless" that no reasonable prospective litigant would have predicted
victory; and (2) the party bringing the baseless lawsuit subjectively had
as its motive the intent of using the lawsuit as a way to detrimentally
affect its competitor. 55 The Supreme Court also made clear in PRE that
the issue of subjective intent was not to be considered unless the first
prong was satisfied. 55
Business torts may also at times rise to the level of monopolizing
conduct. False statements, disparagement, and other business torts can
152. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
153. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
154. 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993).
155. See id. at 1928.
156. See icl Some sense of the burden presented by the first prong is inherent in the
Court's language: "Even in the absence of supporting authority, [the defendant] would have
been entitled to press a novel claim as long as a similarly situated reasonable litigant could
have perceived some likelihood ofsuccess." Id. Prior to PRE, one courtheld thatthe mere
threat to file a frivolous lawsuit could alone establish a § 2 violation. See CVD, Inc. v.
Raytheon, 769 F.2d 842, 851 (lst Cir. 1985).
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violate § 2. 15 The torts must, however, be severe enough to affect not
just a target company but also to detrimentally affect competition in a
market in a manner that leads to or preserves a monopoly.
One certainly can posit extreme circumstances under which sham
litigation or business torts could satisfy § 2's conduct requirement. It
should be cautioned, however, that the sham litigation or business tort
must be so significant that it materially helps defendant achieve or
maintain monopoly power. Few actions are likely to satisfy these
exacting tests.
In hypothetical three, a dominant company (Zeta) sought to prevent
reverse engineering by use of threats of and actual infringement litigation
against a company (Alpha) wishing to reverse engineer to compete in the
service business. Assuming Zeta ultimately loses its infringement suit
because Alpha's reverse engineering is found to be fair use, what are the
prospects of Alpha prevailing in an antitrust counterclaim under a sham
litigation theory? Based on the relatively underdeveloped state of the
copyright law regarding reverse engineering at present, it may be difficult
to satisfy the "objectively baseless" prong of the PRE test. Thus, a
successful antitrust counterclaim is improbable.
c. Monopoly Leveraging
Antitrust law prohibits a monopolist from using its market power in
a market it dominates to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a second
market.'58 This "leveraging" of monopoly power can be accomplished
by a variety of mechanisms such as traditional tying arrangements,
preferential or discriminatory access to information or facilities, and
various distributional restraints, including intellectual property licensing
practices. The state of U.S. antitrust law is much less clear as to whether
such leveraging is unlawful where monopoly power is used to gain
merely an advantage in the second market, but falls short of attempted
or actual monopolization." 9 On balance, it would seem that the recent
trend is against the finding of a violation when monopoly leveraging
157. See, e.g., National Assn. of Pharmaceutical Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs, 850 F.2d 904,
916 (2d Cir. 1988); International Travel Arrangers v. Western Airlines, 623 F.2d 1255 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); Browlee v. Applied Biosystems, Inc., 1989-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,425, at 60,337 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
158. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
159. The uncertainty on this issue arises out of a "gap" in statutory coverage between
§ I and § 2 of the Sherman Act. Whereas § 1 addresses concerted (multilateral) restraints
oftrade, § 2 addresses unilateral conduct onlywhen itthreatens orachieves monopolization
- leaving unilateral restraints of trade facially excluded from the statutory scheme of
protection.
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gains only an advantage in a second market.ea Lest we prematurely
announce the death of leveraging, it should be noted that the theory
figured prominently in the DOJ's suit against Microsoft seeking to stop
its proposed merger with Intuit. The DOJ Complaint stated:
"Microsoft's control of that market [personal finance software] will give
it a cornerstone asset that could be used with its existing dominant
position in operating systems for personal computers to seize control of
the markets of the future, including PC-based home banking."' The
DOJ also relied heavily on a leveraging theory to justify its recent
investigation of Microsoft's imminent entry into the online services
business. 6 '
The monopoly leveraging theory has direct implications for the
analysis of potential antitrust problems associated with reverse engineer-
ing. Both hypotheticals two and three raise leveraging issues. In
hypothetical two, a dominant company seeks to use a reverse engineering
restraint to limit competition in a separate product market it plans to
enter, while in hypothetical three the dominant firm seeks to preserve
and enhance an existing market position in the separate market. Our
analysis suggests that a plaintiff is more likely to succeed with a
leveraging theory in hypothetical three, where the defendant already has
or will imminently have market power in the separate market, than in
hypothetical two where the defendant is only a new entrant.
In cases where actual market share in the separate product market is
low it may be fruitful to pay particularly close attention to the concepts
of innovation and technology markets, because the antitrust defendant
may have a much more prominent and competitively significant position
when viewed from these (rather than end-product) perspectives.
Consider, for example, the situation in hypothetical two, where the
defendant has no share at all of the separate product market for check-
book programs. While a leveraging theory may fail if only end-product
markets are considered, an altogether different result might obtain if it
160. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536,547 (9th Cir. 1991);
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Spectrum
Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,457 (1993) (confirming, in a non-leveraging case,
that "§ 2 makes the conduct ofa single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or
dangerously threatens to do so").
161. Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit to Challenge Microsoft's Purchase of
Intuit, Department ofJustice Antitrust Division Press Release, Apr. 27, 1995, available in
1995WL249007,at*l [hereinafterJustice Department]. Althoughthe Government'ssuit
was brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act, rather than § 2 of the Sherman Act, there has
been substantial convergence of the substantive standards of the two laws in recent cases.
See, e.g., McCaw Personal Communications v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645 F. Supp. 1166,
1173 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
162. See Justice Department, supra note 161, at *2.
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was determined that the defendant had market power relative to
checkbook innovation or technology markets.
. Attempts to Monopolize
This offense, closely related to the offense of monopolization, has
three requirements: (1) predatory or anticompetitive conduct; (2) a
specific intent to control prices or destroy competition; and (3) a
"dangerous probability of success.'"
The conduct element is identical to that required under the offense
of monopolization."6 The intent requirement provides that a general
desire to increase market share will not suffice, but that the defendant
must have a "specific intent to destroy competition or build
monopoly."'" The requisite specific intent cab be proven either directly,
by documents describing the defendant's intent, or indirectly through
inferences drawn from anticompetitive conduct.'6
The dangerous probability requirement is more lenient than the
monopoly power requirement discussed earlier. The same factors are
examined under both monopolization and attempted monopolization
analyses, but attempt requires only a "dangerous probability" that
monopoly power will be achieved. The market share requirement
accordingly is slightly lower, although there are again no magic
thresholds. Whereas monopolization cases usually require a sixty to
seventy percent defendant market share, 67 attempted monopolization
cases usually require only a fifty percent share, and sometimes less.' 68
Every other factor relevant to whether a firm has monopoly power,
particularly ease of entry, is also relevant to whether there is a dangerous
probability of the firm obtaining monopoly power. Because both the
offenses and the evidence required to substantiate them are similar,
antitrust suits alleging monopolization usually also charge attempted
monopolization, and vice-versa. Some suits that prove monopolization
lack the requisite specific intent for attempted monopolization, while
others that prove attempted monopolization lack the requisite monopoly
163. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); see also Spectrum Sports Inc.
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,455-57 (1993).
164. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.
1983).
165. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,626 (1953).
166. See, e.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d
55,74 (2d Cir. 1988); Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532,541 (7th
Cir. 1986); Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 163 (10th Cir.
1986); see also A.B.A., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 55, at 260-61.
167. See supra part IV(A)(2).
168. See A.B.A., ANTrrRuST LAW DEVELoPMENTS, supra note 55, at 213-14.
No. 2]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Technology
power for monopolization. Most of the difficult cases that fail, however,
fail because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the requisite
anticompetitive conduct, thus dooming efforts to prove both offenses.
C. Tying Arrangements
A tying arrangement is typically defined as "an agreement by a party
to sell [or lease] one product [or service] but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases [or leases] a different (or tied) product [or
service], or at least agrees that he will not purchase [or lease] that
product [or service] from any other supplier."' 69 Tying arrangements are
illegal if several conditions are met: (1) the existence of two separate
products or services; (2) the firm tying the products has sufficient market
power in the tying product to make "forcing" possible; and (3) the
arrangement forecloses a "substantial volume of commerce" or produces
a substantial potential of an adverse effect on competition in the market
for the tied product' In addition, even though tying arrangements are
per se illegal, the offense is in reality governed by a standard close to a
rule of reason standard because courts generally permit an efficiency or
business justification defense.'
71
The first requirement - that the tied items be considered different
products - invokes all of the market definition issues discussed
above,172 as well as whether there is separate demand for the items."7
The second "forcing" requirement is similar to the monopoly power
requirement discussed in part IV(A)(2) 74 The opinion in Jefferson
Parish suggested that at least a thirty percent defendant market share is
required. 7 This requirement is nuanced, however, by the Kodak
holding that under certain circumstances market share and market power
169. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); see also United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (holding explicitly that both services and products are
covered by this body of antitrust law); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S.
451 (1922) (including leases as well as sales).
170. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984).
171. See United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afrd,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
172. See supra part IV(A)(1).
173. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-21. For example, while diagnostic software
and repair services are physically distinct entities, both items may still be considered part
ofa single antitrustmarket. See also suprapartIV(A)(2) (discussing th6 monopoly power
requirement).
174. The Court noted, "we have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has
some special ability - usually called 'market power' - to force a purchaser to do
something thathe would notdo in a competitive market." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-
14.
175. See id. at 17, 26-29.
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should be measured in an aftermarket situation from the perspective of
locked-in customers, 76 and by the controversy discussed in part III
(A)(2) over whether the existence of a copyright leads to a presumption
thatthe copyright owner has monopoly power. Regardless, the firm must
have the power to force consumers to purchase a product they otherwise
would not want. The third requirement is that a substantial volume of
commerce must be foreclosed to other potential sellers of the tied
product, or that there is a substantial potential of anticompetitive effects
in the tied market. Although it is difficult to determine precisely how
much this requirement adds to the second, the Seventh Circuit has held
that an antitrust plaintiff must show "a substantial danger that the tying
seller will acquire market power in the tied product market."' 7 In this
respect, the requirement is similar to the showing required under
monopoly leveraging.
Either of the two basic types of tying arrangements - an agreement
by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchase a different product, or an agreement that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier (sometimes called a "tie-
out" or "negative tie") - could be present in reverse engineering
situations. Consider hypothetical two, in which MicroBig refused to
disclose required information (via reverse engineering) to allow other
companies to build compatible checkbook programs. It is possible to
conceptualize this situation as a type of technological tying, in which
buyers of MicroBig's spreadsheet program who want a compatible
checkbook program are essentially forced to buy the MicroBig program.
The likelihood of a tying theory succeeding in this situation would
depend on a number of factors, including whether buyers of MicroBig's
spreadsheet would be considered a distinct antitrust aftermarket because
they have been locked-in, and whether the checkbook program would be
considered a separate product from the spreadsheet. Regarding the latter
point, software products are often composed of numerous code modules,
and it is often difficult to draw clear lines between distinct programs
whose codes interact extensively. For example, MicroBig could simply
include the checkbook functionality as a module within its spreadsheet
program using a common interface. It would no doubt argue that such
an integration was more convenient to end-users and therefore pro-
competitive. From an antitrust view, however, should this be deemed
any less a tie than if the programs were marketed as distinct, but
technologically tied, pieces of code? These are very difficult questions
176. See supra part IV(A)(2).
177. Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n v. First Condominium Dev. Co., 758
F.2d 203,210 (7th Cir. 1985).
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to answer, and highlight the difficulty of applying these theories to
complex software cases.'
In hypothetical three, we also confront a situation where tying issues
are likely to emerge. By refusing to allow reverse engineering of its
operating system and diagnostic software, it might be argued that Zeta is
forcing buyers of its computers and software to also obtain service from
Zeta. Similar issues were raised in the Data General case, where the
First Circuit found that diagnostic software was distinct from support
services, but there was no evidence that customers were actually
"coerced" into buying a product they did not otherwise want1 9 The
specific practice in issue was Data General's policy of making its
diagnostic software available only to customers who maintained their
own computers. On the issue of coercion, the court found that there was
no evidence that customers who chose the self-maintenance option
(rather than using an independent service provider) were in any way
coerced to do so. 8'
In our third hypothetical, the element of coercion would be
significant. In, order to sustain a tying theory, there would have to be
evidence of coercion either by express contractual terms (i.e., the
licensing terms for the operating system and diagnostic software require
the buyer to use Zeta's support services) or by clear circumstantial
evidence. In this case, assuming Zeta is modestly educated on antitrust
law, proof of coercion is likely to be based on technological necessity:
service cannot be provided to the Zeta computers without either access
(i.e., a license to use) or knowledge gained by reverse engineering of the
operating system and diagnostic software. Thus, by denying access to
other potential service providers Zeta effectively precludes them from
offering service and forces customers to buy service only from Zeta. If
this is the theory employed, then there would still have to be evidence
that customers plainly wanted Alpha's service and that it was Zeta's
denial of access which was preventing them from using Alpha. Our
hypothetical also raises the interesting question of whether Zeta's
litigation and liability threats might also be deemed to constitute at least
part of the required coercion.
As this discussion suggests, success under this theory would require
a number of formidable proofs, such as establishing that competing
service providers could not, as a practical matter, develop their own
178. Disappointingly few of these issues arose in Data General See supra part IV
(A)(3)(a)(ii). The court examined a tying allegation, but found neither distinct products,
nortying, nor anticompetitive forcing. See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support





diagnostic software and render maintenance services without reverse
engineering the antitrust defendant's product. It is unlikely that there
will be many cases where all of these circumstances are present and can
be proven. Nevertheless, in those cases where all of the necessary
elements are present, the goals of competition and maximum innovation
are best served by successful antitrust litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent software copyright decisions suggest attend toward rejecting
a per se infringement standard for software decompilation and the
creation of at least a narrow category of activity protected under the fair
use exemption. This trend, in turn, raises the possibility that certain
efforts to enforce or use copyright protection to restrain such fair use will
give rise to antitrust liability. Unfortunately, there is little case law
interpreting and applying both the underlying copyright law pertaining
to reverse engineering and antitrust claims arising out of such disputes.
In exploring these relatively uncharted waters, we have found no
overriding legal or policy bases to shield this area from reasoned antitrust
scrutiny. For reasons discussed throughout this Article, there may be
relatively few instances where efforts to restrain reverse engineering
actually give rise to antitrust liability. Nevertheless, in situations
involving essential facilities, tying, and similar practices, the vigorous
application of antitrust principles complements intellectual property law
and helps foster the common goals of both bodies of law - the
encouragement of innovation, industry, and competition.
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